tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-83697694788559515972024-02-18T19:50:36.789-08:00Airport Security MonitorBEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.comBlogger53125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-18501348718790272102013-09-22T02:12:00.000-07:002013-09-22T02:18:51.431-07:00TSA’s PreCheck security program fails to deal with the real problemBy Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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The <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/" target="_blank">Transportation Security Administration (TSA)</a> is now expanding its <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck" target="_blank">PreCheck</a> security program (for a hefty price paid by willing passengers) so that they won’t have to remove certain clothing items and even be allowed to keep a laptop in their carry-on bag.<br />
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This, it is claimed, will mean less waiting time in security screening queues, increase passenger satisfaction and positively affect bottom line security costs. This seems like a really good policy decision, but there are some hidden costs involved, as well as the critical issue of whether such a PreCheck program will actually reduce queuing time and passenger frustration.<br />
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Rather than argue from a “what if” position, I would like to apply some empirical results that emerged from the ground-breaking<a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank"> BEMOSA Project</a>, which examined both employee and passenger behavior as it related to security decision-making in airports.<br />
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For one, nothing has changed in terms of prohibited items. Even without this new program, there was no prohibition against wearing shoes, a belt or bringing a laptop on board the aircraft. They simply had to be checked as potential carriers of explosives. What was prohibited remains on the prohibited list and from the BEMOSA Project it appears that the vast majority of prohibited items found among passengers are liquids.<br />
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More to the point, they are predominantly found among charter passengers (most likely holiday seekers!). But then it gets a bit more complicated as we also found that passengers who are “caught” with such prohibited items actually negotiate with the screeners, so as to not lose their $100 bottle of whiskey. This is a major contributor to the long and frustrating wait for those in the queue.<br />
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What this means is that even if you do apply PreCheck to passengers, it will likely completely miss the real culprits who are slowing down the throughput of passengers. It would be very rare that a holiday maker on a charter flight would pay an extra fee just to get a “free pass.” And even those with the security clearance will still have their carry-on bags checked for prohibited items. The net effect will probably be the same.<br />
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Now let’s take a quick look at the hidden costs of checking passenger in order to obtain a PreCheck clearance. As the TSA is not divulging how they will randomly give a green light for certain passengers to get PreCheck permits, the costs of this decision-making process is unknown. However, as it is based on a risk assessment, this means that there are employees working on attaining these risk assessments which are dynamic in nature. This means the costs are not a one-time deal; they require highly skilled employees working continuously to assess risks.<br />
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Then there is, of course, the fee for having the privilege of starting the PreCheck process, a payment which is a transparent cost. But it would appear that applicants also have to submit fingerprints (more employees) and be interviewed (more employees). Then there is all the administration to keep this system running (even more employees). It simply does not seem reasonable that this fee ($85, $100) would cover these costs. And, if not, who is paying for it?<br />
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Taken together, the actual benefits of increasing passenger throughput and the costs for allowing passengers to get through screening with their shoes and laptop in a carry-on bag seem a bit exaggerated and certainly extravagant.<br />
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*Prof Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum, founder and CEO of <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank">Kirschenbaum Consulting</a>.<br />
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BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-41354118823043172522013-07-03T07:08:00.001-07:002013-07-03T08:20:04.360-07:00Are TSA screeners really slower than amateurs? <div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A recent<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13506285.2013.790329#preview" target="_blank"> report</a> published on <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/travel/tsa-screeners-slower-amateurs-more-accurate-study-says-6C10382404" target="_blank">NBC</a> under the title, “TSA screeners slower than amateurs, but more accurate” raises some serious questions. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The paper, which appeared in an obscure journal that focuses mainly on physical aspects of vision cognition, is certainly an eye catcher, until you look more carefully at the researchers’ results and try to figure out if the innuendos about the accuracy and speed of TSA trained screeners inability to match “amateurs” are what they actually found. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Several issues are involved here. The first is that the “amateurs” were in fact college students, the proverbial “cannon fodder” of academic researchers in their quest to conduct experiments. The second is the relevance of these results for airport security.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The experiment revolves around identification of the letter “T” (sometimes) placed on a screen with various other “Ts” but not exactly the same or in the correct position. According to the results, accuracy and time in identifying the “T” differed. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The differences, as far as I could determine, were not statistically significant, meaning they could have all been achieved by sheer chance. Moreover, this experiment was done without the usual external noises and pressures that are part of the daily life of security screeners.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Even more dubious is the substance of the comparison: screeners are trained to identify objects while college students focus most of their efforts on dealing with and comprehending words. No great wonder that students saw the letter more quickly, but when it came to accuracy the screeners beat them out. The rest is all interpretation, with the article’s authors bringing us the earth-shattering news that consistency is the key to better performance.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">So what does this have to do with airport security? Does this mean that hiring amateurs is better than investing in training screeners? As airport managers want to increase throughput of passengers, no doubt that 1–2 second difference in spotting that “T” may make a difference. But what about the consequences?</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">It all comes down to accuracy versus speed. The screeners were more accurate – meaning fewer false alarms and greater chances of spotting the prohibited items. The college students were quicker but made more mistakes. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">As a security manager, which one would you opt for? Part of that answer was revealed in the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA Project</a> where up to 40 percent of the security employees stated they bent, broke, ignored and even went against the rules – despite knowing full well what was on the screen and who was in front of them.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">This headline enticer requires a lot of caution when one realizes that we are dealing with a sanitized experiment in a controlled environment where the results may have very little to do with the real social world outside the experiment’s booth. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">This is particularly true in the case of airports which are complex social organizations with rich and vibrant social networks that the BEMOSA project has amply revealed. Therefore, it might be wise to keep both eyes open the next time you see this kind of article. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> *Prof Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum, founder and CEO of <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank">Kirschenbaum Consulting</a>.</span></div>
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BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-11297374572203389002013-05-05T07:56:00.000-07:002013-07-03T08:21:53.260-07:00Airport employees security badge breach more positive than threatening By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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The latest news sensation in airport security was recently discovered in <a href="http://www.nbcdfw.com/investigations/Airline-Airport-Employees-Caught-Abusing-Security-Badges-205288061.html" target="_blank">police reports</a> which revealed that certain airport employees at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport were using their security badges for the evil purpose of assisting family members to avoid waiting in line to board aircraft.<br />
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One solution expressed by a security consultant was to discard security badges altogether and require all security employees to be physically checked like any other passenger. That, another consultant said, would bring the airport to a standstill.<br />
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What we have in these seemingly two contradictory pieces of “advice” is the inherent conflict that imposed security rules, regulations and protocols have on the smooth operation of airports. For the engineer, what counts is processing of passengers and cargo through mass production factory principles.<br />
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But the reality of airport operations cannot hide the fact that airports are complex social organizations maintained, inhabited and operated by employees and passengers. People! The “security geek’s” assumption that employees and passengers are cogs in a well-oiled mass processing machine simply does not match up to the reality of airport behavior by either passengers or employees.<br />
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In reality, a large proportion of security decisions does not comply with rules and protocols. Recent research found that passengers negotiate their way through the security system. Even the use of technology in making security decisions depends on the degree of trust employees have in the equipment.<br />
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Bending the rules has become symptomatic of the intense commercial interest of airports to remain viable economic enterprises. One way has apparently been to allow more latitude in how security decisions are made.<br />
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How then can this inherent conflict between security rules and human behavior be reconciled?<br />
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Let’s go back to the use of the security badge to expedite getting (usually family members) through the airport without going through security processes. This non-compliant decision was likely strongly influenced by such factors as co-workers’ and friends’ opinions and support, and even the security climate in the airport.<br />
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Utilizing the security badge was a judgment call on the part of the worker that had little impact on actual security threats and fitted into a framework of adapting to the situation. This decision-making process of adapting is widespread enough that co-workers support it. This is probably why the only reason these “breaches” were reported was that they emerged from police reports. Keeping rules for “the rule’s sake” is an incongruity within the social framework of airport security.<br />
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Employees are very aware of potential and real security threats and, certainly, making it less painful for those whom they trust to get through the security system seems more positive than threatening.<br />
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*Prof Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum, founder and CEO of <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank">Kirschenbaum Consulting</a>.<br />
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<br />BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-58411743306354629882013-04-10T03:13:00.002-07:002013-04-10T03:18:36.081-07:00More attention should be paid to the human factor in airport securityBy <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/dynamic.aspx?page=11277" target="_blank">Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum</a>*<br />
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<b>Kirschenbaum Consulting</b>’s recent <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2013/04/charter-passengers-carry-prohibited-items.html" target="_blank">study</a> showing that passengers of charter flights are responsible for the majority of extra costs arising from delays in airport security checks won extensive media coverage.<br />
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Following the publication of the findings, we received many comments to which I will try to relate in this post. Our evidence about charter versus commercial flight passengers as a crude measure for gauging security costs is only one highlight of a complex and cutting edge research program carried out by the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA (Behaviour Modelling for Security in Airports) Project</a> we were involved in.<br />
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The decision to highlight these results stems from an obvious need to reevaluate the role that passengers play in airport security. Until now, most studies of passenger “throughput” have been classical in their objective – reducing the time it takes to “process” passengers.<br />
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This is actually in line with how airports are designed, primarily as mass production units that regard passengers as passive cogs in the service of engineering design and logistic optimization.<br />
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The introduction of security technology was a natural outcome of such a perspective as it once more marginalized both employees and passengers by minimizing the need for what we know as the complexity of making security decisions under conditions of uncertainty. This complexity actually showed itself in the fact that close to 40 percent of the employees in airports dispersed throughout Europe actually bent, broke, ignored or even went against the security rules and protocols.<br />
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What we did was introduce passengers into the security decision-making process from a human factor perspective. Anyone going through the checkpoint screening process cannot but help but recognize that some passengers interact with the security employees. We noted that while some were very passive and almost automatically acquiesced to orders to open bags or leave items behind, we also noted that others acted differently, and there were those who even argued. Giving away a $100 bottle of prize whisky was not taken lightly.<br />
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All this negotiating took time, and given the practical and ethical problems involved in interviewing passengers during this screening process, we were restricted in distinguishing passengers by the type of flight they were about to board – commercial or charter. The costing was a relatively easy exercise and we simply made the association between the two.<br />
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The point of showing how charter and commercial passengers can have a direct impact on security costs was obvious. Nevertheless, the more important point was that we only exposed the tip of the iceberg in understanding passenger behavior and its impact on airport security.<br />
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This in itself could bring about a “revolution” in making the passenger experience more positive and in doing so benefit the commercial interests of airports and perhaps change the perspective of airports as mass processing production lines to service providers. In both cases, everyone wins.<br />
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*Prof Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum, founder and CEO of <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank">Kirschenbaum Consulting</a>.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-52245794685619088392013-04-07T05:03:00.000-07:002013-04-14T05:11:29.690-07:00Prof. Kirschenbaum to present BEMOSA's finding at Passenger Terminal Expo 2013<b>Prof Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum</b>, founder and CEO of <b><a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank">Kirschenbaum Consulting</a></b> will present the findings of BEMOSA's first in-depth study of European airports at the <a href="http://www.passengerterminal-expo.com/" target="_blank">Passenger Terminal Expo</a>, which will take place on April 9–11, 2013, in Geneva Switzerland.<br />
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Prof. Kirschenbaum will hold a presentation on April 11 at 12:30 as part of the "Aviation Security, Border Control & Facilitation" session. <br />
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The presentation, titled "Taken For a Ride: Does Airport Security Really Work?" will focus on the results of a study conducted by EU-funded project <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA (Behaviour Modelling for Security in Airports</a>), which was headed by Prof. Kirschenbaum. The findings are based on over 500 interviews and 700 ethnographic observations held at airports across Europe.<br />
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At the event, Prof. Kirschenbaum will present a newly developed behavior model that aims to describe how people make security decisions in the face of reality during “normal routine” and crises. The results of the study indicate that the current design of airport security does not take into account the social behaviour of passengers and employees. BEMOSA results show that the processing within an airport's security framework, founded on rational and logical systems, is failing.<br />
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The audience will be presented with the reality of employee security decision-making behaviour in airports across Europe. This forms the basis for reexamining the basic concepts involved in airport security, and the alternative means that can be implemented to enhance it.<br />
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Prof. Kirschenbaum will also participate in a panel discussion on April 11 at 12:55 titled "Accounting for the human factor in aviation security." Other participants at the panel include <b>Claudio Mauerhofer</b>, Security Coordinator, at the Federal Office of Civil Aviation FOCA, Switzerland; <b>Klaus Heindrichs</b>, Project Manager, Cologne Bonn Airport and <b>Uta Kohse</b>, Managing Partner, Airport Research Center GmbH.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-4309785397664873002013-04-05T07:35:00.000-07:002013-04-07T07:47:14.763-07:0033–50% of charter passengers carry prohibited items Passengers of charter flights are responsible for the majority of extra costs arising from delays in airport security checks, according to scientific research conducted by <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank"><b>Kirschenbaum Consulting</b></a>.<br />
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The results indicate that while only 10–15% of scheduled passengers carried prohibited items, 33–50% of charter passengers did so. Moreover, while only 10% of regular flyers were re-examined by security employees, 33% of charter passengers needed another check.<br />
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“Security has become a key cost component in airports. Passenger behavior and its significance to airport profits should not be underestimated,” said Prof <b>Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum</b>, founder and CEO of Kirschenbaum Consulting. “We can clearly see that delays at the screening check point are directly related to the type of passenger involved. This requires paying more attention to the role that the human factor can have on security costs.”<br />
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The findings, that are based on a one-year in-depth study held at a regional European airport, also showed that, while charter passengers accounted for less than 50% of overall traffic, they were responsible for an additional 35% of the overall security costs.<br />
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Even though the majority of passengers pass through the security process very quickly, passengers who negotiate with the security personal consume close to 80% of the time spent passing through screening.<br />
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Kirschenbaum added that it could be conjectured that charter passengers were more likely to purchase holiday gifts and, given their lower sensitivity to security, more likely to be stopped for possessing prohibited items.<br />
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Airports estimate that it should take 20–30 seconds for a regular passenger to pass through the security screening process. The research showed, however, that it took those ignorant of the rules one to two minutes.<br />
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The study also showed that 85–90% of the prohibited items that delayed processing were liquids, with the remaining 10–15% consisting of knives, manicure files, paralytic sprays, cigarette lighters, imitation children’s toys and tools.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-41076095908471927672013-03-08T05:39:00.000-08:002013-03-10T22:41:44.813-07:00Reality sets the tone for new TSA airport security regulationsBy Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
<br />
It has finally started. The U.S. <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/" target="_blank">Transportation Security Administration (TSA)</a> has started to reduce the number of <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/prohibited-items" target="_blank">prohibited items</a> that passengers need to deposit at security screening points before being allowed to board flights.<br />
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True, the items include such "dangerous" weapons as pocketknives, golf clubs and waffle ball style bats but it is a step in the right direction.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><a href="http://blog.tsa.gov/2013/03/tsa-prohibited-items-list-changing_5.html" target="_blank"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqUjOyeOfPNEWHFcKIGwhgVry9C560Xg-rQHJytO1JpkfFauEh_pJYIFuC5sezJXRN9lMzZDOIgtbsvYxdY8_Go9ddMdMQ-sSke-xmjtO7Q6OwlbPR_MMtGLl8UK1-pK3NfBcOLsz5uzaT/s320/2+TSA_Permitted+Items+final_Page_3.jpg" width="320" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://blog.tsa.gov/2013/03/tsa-prohibited-items-list-changing_5.html" target="_blank">Source: The TSA Blog</a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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The recent announcement is a decision that reflects a much more realistic assessment of airport security as the prohibited items regulators put on the "hit list" were reactions to a period when hijacking was the easiest and most effective way for terrorists to get attention. Now, with double pilot cabin doors, your trusty penknife or golf clubs will not do very much damage. Nevertheless, the other reality of airport security – namely bottom line profits is also at play here. I would even argue that it played a critical role in bringing about this small step toward a more rational security policy.<br />
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In this case, two 'bottom-line' factors are at work in making these decisions and ensure airports remain financially viable: one magic bullet is increasing passenger "throughput". Logically, getting ever-increasing numbers of passengers in shorter times through the security screening process reduces security labor costs. It may also make passengers more amiable to purchase more goods and services (and of course cause less delayed flights).<br />
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How do you expedite this process? By simply keep reducing the number of prohibited items that need to be searched for, the time allocated in the queuing and searching process can be substantially reduced. <br />
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Let's look at this argument in terms of empirical evidence recently published from the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA project</a>. This encompassed a detailed ethnographic "time-motion" study of an airport in addition to detailed interviews of security employees at another eight airports across Europe. It clearly showed that security screening is a social platform for negotiating between passenger and security employee when prohibited items show up.<br />
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This negotiating can move from outright refusal to give up an item to trying to convince the security employee to let the item pass. So much for rule compliance and the triumph of technology.<br />
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More interesting is that about 85-90 percent of the prohibited items that delayed processing were liquids; the remainder of confiscated items (10-15%) included knifes, manicure files, paralytic sprays, cigarette lighters, imitation children toys such as guns and knifes and in rare cases tools. And of course, those hidden pocketknives (more likely loose change or house keys) led to the necessity to have every third passenger retrace their steps and go through the metal detectors at least one more time.<br />
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A closer look at the passengers who were holding things up during the negotiating stages found them to be predominantly composed of "holiday makers" heading for a charter flight!<br />
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What this all suggests is that eliminating prohibited items by administrative fiat is too simple a solution to a very complex social and organizational problem. Dealing with passengers as people and not passive cogs in a mass production processing system requires looking at hard behavioral evidence and putting it within the social context of airport security. By looking at the human factor, security can be enhanced just as it has been done so through sophisticated technology.<br />
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*Prof Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum, founder and CEO of <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank">Kirschenbaum Consulting</a>.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-42797388922249069692013-02-21T08:34:00.000-08:002013-02-21T08:43:36.574-08:00Can a remote queue management system for airport security work in reality?By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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A recent <a href="http://www.airport-world.com/home/general-news/item/2322-world-first-warsaw-chopin-launches-remote-queue-management-system-for-airport-security" target="_blank">report</a> indicates that <a href="http://www.lotnisko-chopina.pl/" target="_blank">Warsaw Chopin</a> is the first airport in the world to launch a remote queue management system aimed at controlling queue lengths and reducing the waiting time for security checks. The arrangement of the queuing configuration that directs the flow of passengers into the security screening path will automatically and seamlessly change according to queuing pressures.<br />
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<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.lotnisko-chopina.pl/en/passenger/passenger-check-in/Checking-in/3.express-self-check-in/image_mini" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="Source: Warsaw Chopin site" border="0" src="http://www.lotnisko-chopina.pl/en/passenger/passenger-check-in/Checking-in/3.express-self-check-in/image_mini" title="" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Source: Warsaw Chopin site</td></tr>
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<span id="goog_248453792"></span><span id="goog_248453793"></span>No more unnecessary waiting in line, no more frustrated and angry passengers. Remote control at its finest. And, no need for human intervention or interference: no need for security personal to mix with passengers, argue with them, make judgments, be friendly or explain long delays. Information will now be relayed by sensors to software that will take this hazardous and annoying part of the security process and sanitize it. Heaven on earth!<br />
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But, if we look a little closer at the basic idea of continuing the “automation” of airport passenger processing by minimizing any contact or decisions by employees, we should also take into account the fact that passengers are not mindless, individual robots. Nor are they passive cogs in a mass processing factory.<br />
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Just picture the possibility of a family consisting of parents, children and grandparents on their way to enjoy a family vacation. They are waiting in line together, when all of a sudden the posts or guidance tapes change configuration and they find themselves split up. Great for optimizing the flow of passengers but terrible for the family members. And what can we expect regarding their probable behaviour?<br />
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Those posts and tapes will likely be ignored in favour of family togetherness. And others seeing this will also likely do the same. The technology does not accept that passengers are not cattle that blindly follow the chosen path.<br />
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So, we are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, we have sophisticated technology that should reduce queuing time, facilitate throughput and reduce costs and passenger dissatisfaction. On the other, we have passenger social behaviour which, to the airport designer, seems not only unreasonable but downright irrational. Complicate this situation with the fact that passengers are a very diverse population culturally, socially and economically. Some have experience in airport travel while others do not. Some arrive at airports as family units and others do not. Some are on charter flights and others on commercial scheduled flights. All these differences among passengers are simply not accounted for in the security processes.<br />
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A good example of this diversity emerged from the<a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank"> BEMOSA (Behavior Modeling for Security in Airports) Project</a>. Close observations of passengers during the screening process discovered distinct stages where passengers and security employees actually negotiate over items screeners decide are prohibited to bring onboard.<br />
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These stages range from accepting the decision to more time-consuming (and costly) stages of negotiating (and even arguing and refusal). While this analysis was done to gauge the actual costs of screening security, what emerged was that by characterizing passengers on the simple basis of being a “charter” or “scheduled” flight passenger, we could predict how the negotiation process would develop.<br />
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Here is a clear case where passengers do make a critical impact on security processes. So, despite all the efforts to eliminate the human factor in airport security through greater use of sophisticated technology, airport security designers still have to face the unpleasant fact that passengers are the life blood of air transportation. Paying attention to them rather than ignoring them is rule number one for commercial survival.<br />
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*Prof Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum, founder and CEO of <a href="http://www.kirschenbaumconsulting.com/" target="_blank">Kirschenbaum Consulting</a>.<br />
<br />BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com5Warsaw, Poland52.2296756 21.01222870000003751.9184766 20.366781700000036 52.5408746 21.657675700000038tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-87815256556450848092013-01-23T07:09:00.003-08:002013-01-23T07:11:41.722-08:00Body Scanner: Who says looks don’t count? <br />
By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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The recent <a href="http://blog.tsa.gov/2013/01/rapiscan-backscatter-contract.html" target="_blank">decision</a> of the <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/" target="_blank">TSA</a> to replace one type of body scanner with another is, at first glance, a remarkable shift in policy for the agency that is the final arbitrator of all matters dealing with airport security. Even more surprising, this decision was brought about by the pressures of non-airport security stakeholders (the Electronic Privacy Information Center), and related to privacy issues rather than security.<br />
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<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOvaRKz0cScztoopmVqqsFBw8VQ0gqTzN3zuFdOVdj7B35oaKszh_yHRQi4ywStjRH0gKX8rLtjkDckJxGc0OUE0k9zsxnV2Ydk82IxoZHnPJbZlcS8ggtKOqQ6f0Uy4K57iLCs3KMut7P/s1600/ATR-Picture_Monitor.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="156" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOvaRKz0cScztoopmVqqsFBw8VQ0gqTzN3zuFdOVdj7B35oaKszh_yHRQi4ywStjRH0gKX8rLtjkDckJxGc0OUE0k9zsxnV2Ydk82IxoZHnPJbZlcS8ggtKOqQ6f0Uy4K57iLCs3KMut7P/s200/ATR-Picture_Monitor.jpg" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Source: TSA blog</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
This shift in policy is, of course, a bit simplistic as the installation of alternative body scanners remains. The goal is to detect as fast as possible those persons who carry items deemed a threat to security. My emphasis on “as fast as possible” is the reason for body scanners as airport management is extremely sensitive to increasing “through-put,” that magical word that is directly linked to bottom line profits or losses. It is a technological fix that fits into the assembly line design of airports as a people-processing factory. But the technology does have its limits. And people aren’t always compliant.<br />
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This was brought home in an analysis, during the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA project</a>, of the role that passengers play at screening check points. For conventional screening (and it seems for full body scanners as well), screening detection and threat avoidance is guided by rule compliance. The technology is very sophisticated, but we found that there was a problem with employees bending, breaking or ignoring the rules, and even more problematic was passenger behavior. Passengers argued and negotiated with the security employees! What we discovered was that security checking is a complex social process and not the simplistic picture of automated filtering by technology.<br />
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The critical time factor of the passenger negotiating over a prohibited item not only put the proverbial monkey wrench into the spokes of the technology, but was, in fact, the key to the flow affecting passenger “through-put.” Shaving off 2-5 seconds per passenger by an advanced algorithm paled in comparison to the time-consuming social process of negotiating whether to open a bag, go through the metal detector, refusal to give up an expensive bottle of whisky or even take off shoes!<br />
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So the TSA policy change is really no change at all as it still continues (with an internal logic of justification) to seek the design of a better mouse trap. But to do so there still remains the missing link – employees and passengers. Perhaps the king will realize he is naked only when the evidence proves it to be the case.<br />
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*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).<br />
<br />BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-11735133533177478182013-01-03T01:44:00.002-08:002013-01-03T08:43:32.994-08:00IATA’s new airport security vision neglect the human factorBy Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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As part of its 2012 annual review, the<a href="http://www.iata.org/" target="_blank"> International Air Transport Association (IATA)</a> has forecast that airline traffic is expected to rise to 3.6 billion passengers in 2016 from 2.8 billion in 2011.<br />
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The recent <a href="http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2012-12-06-01.aspx" target="_blank">IATA review</a> covers the issue of security as part of its comprehensive program to strengthen the air industry. Security, as we all know, has been prominent in public and scientific discussion and it is satisfying to note that the new vision for the checkpoint of the future (CoF) is one response to make airport and air travel more secure and pleasant for the passenger.<br />
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The emphasis of this effort appears to be primarily focused on technological means to enhance security – developing technology and software to enhance (API) advanced passenger information and (PRN) passenger name record information. The implication is that this will promote passenger flow-through and reduce inconvenience and “friction” for passengers during their airport experience.<br />
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The notable “missing link” in this vision is people. Certainly, technology is a critical part of airport security, but this perspective ignores the fact that the entire security decision-making process is in the hands of both employees and to some extent the passengers. Nor is there mention of the airport as a complex social organization within which employees and passengers interact with security technology within two distinct social and communications networks – the formal administrative and informal.<br />
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These extremely vital aspects presented in the IATA report are marginalized, as they do not reflect how security actually operates in reality.<br />
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It is here that the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA project</a> has made a major contribution to providing an evidence-based depiction of the actual behavioral security decision-making process among a wide range of employees in airports distributed across Europe. The fact that up to 40 percent of the decision-makers bend, break and even ignore the rules; that security decisions are primarily made within groups; that most threats are assessed as false alarms; the degree to which employees trust security technology and to which the opinions of friends directly impacts on rule compliance are the reality of security in airports.<br />
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These findings can be integrated into the checkpoint of the future by recognizing that technology is only one component in the airport triumvirate for not only enhancing security but also making airports viable business organizations.<br />
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The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports). This article was first published in <a href="http://i-hls.com/" target="_blank">i-HLS</a> Web site.*BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-25425094114903758032012-12-11T06:49:00.000-08:002012-12-11T06:56:32.485-08:00Drunk passengers more threat to airport security than terrorismDrunk and disorderly passengers are more likely to pose a threat to airport security than terrorism, <a href="http://www.alankirschenbaum.com/" target="_blank">Professor Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum</a>, coordinator of the Behaviour Modeling for Security in Airports (BEMOSA), told the popular Russian magazine <strong>Ogonoik</strong>. <br />
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In the <a href="http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2056409" target="_blank">interview</a>, Kirschenbaum, a professor at the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, said that following in depth research of security apparatus in European airports, “unmanaged drunken passengers” were considered the most serious threat to everyday operations. <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgjV6NZRkf5erT2xO_a9FIZGMaH-8cIoeLHxFIJODl7HDl29aJ2poi0PjHsa94XmgUf3U85vyKYbdaaiTZ7KIZuYXyr1-lF_s8fWXMvhm0JDStB5aCZQW8hRRpPn04VmjdQu_9Ln5DbDvyR/s1600/Bemosa_airport_security1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="144" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgjV6NZRkf5erT2xO_a9FIZGMaH-8cIoeLHxFIJODl7HDl29aJ2poi0PjHsa94XmgUf3U85vyKYbdaaiTZ7KIZuYXyr1-lF_s8fWXMvhm0JDStB5aCZQW8hRRpPn04VmjdQu_9Ln5DbDvyR/s200/Bemosa_airport_security1.jpg" width="200" /></a>Although occurances of drunk and disorderly behavior on flights have diminished due to new European Union laws forbidding the passage of more than 100 mililiters of liquid, including alchohol, on flights, most alchohol consumption takes place at airports themselves, prior to flights. <br />
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Airport bars, cafes and duty free shops all sell alchohol in large quantities, said Kirschenbaum. </div>
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As a result of the growing number of drunken passengers on airlines, he pointed out that the US have specially trained air marshalls patrolling flights. They are able to arrest disorderly or aggressive individuals and hand them over the law enforcement upon landing. <br />
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Kirschenbaum also told the website that in Israel, such guards have been present on flights for many years. He also pointed out that security proceedures differ greatly to Europe, with more emphasis placed on monitoring people and less emphasis on the goods they are carrying. Much of Israel’s security technologies have been adopted in airports worldwide, finished Kirschenbaum. BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-19280494657664073802012-11-21T09:08:00.003-08:002012-12-11T07:50:09.206-08:00BEMOSA to participate in Airport Exchange 2012 in AmsterdamRepresentatives from the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA</a> (Behaviour Modelling for Security in Airports) consortium will participate in <a href="http://www.airport-exchange.com/" target="_blank">Airport Exchange 2012</a>, which will take place from November 26–28, 2012 in Amsterdam.<br />
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Prof. Alan Kirschenbaum of the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, a world expert in disaster management and initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA, will be available to discuss the results of the BEMOSA research on the impact of the human factor on airport security.<br />
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BEMOSA is a Europe-wide research project aimed at improving security in airports through enhancing the capability of airport authority personnel to correctly detect potential security hazards and reduce false alarms.<br />
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BEMOSA has developed a behaviour model that aims to describe how people make security decisions in the face of reality during “normal routine” and crisis situations. This is expected to result in increased security, reduced false alarms and increased profitability.<br />
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The findings are based on some 360 interviews of security personnel in eight European airports. Prof. Kirschenbaum will also be able to explore avenues of applying the results in future training programs of airport security personal.<br />
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Airport Exchange is jointly staged by both ACI EUROPE and ACI Asia-Pacific, and alternates between Europe and Asia. The event is dedicated this year to “Airports 2020,” and the ideas, processes, solutions and equipment that could be commonplace at airports in 2020 will be presented.<br />
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<br />BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-48563345129377133502012-11-13T03:05:00.001-08:002012-11-25T09:03:26.878-08:00Top International aviation security organisations on one stage at BEMOSA's Capstone conferenceSenior representatives from leading European and International aviation security organizations will meet at <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/66-invitation-for-the-bemosa-capstone-conference-applications-implications-of-human-factors-on-airport-security" target="_blank">BEMOSA's Capstone Conference</a>, which will take place in Brussels on November 29–30, 2012, to discuss the applications and implications of human factors on airport security.<br />
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Officials from the following organizations, who will participate in the different panels, have already confirmed their attendance: <br />
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<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.aci-europe.org/" target="_blank">Airport Council International (ACI)</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.tsa.gov/" target="_blank">Transport Security Agency of the United States (TSA)</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.eos-eu.com/" target="_blank">The European Organisation for Security (EOS)</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.acare4europe.org/" target="_blank">The Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe (ACARE)</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.assa-int.org/" target="_blank">The Aviation Security Services Association-International (ASSA-I)</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.ecac-ceac.org/" target="_blank">European Civil Association Conference (ECAC)</a></li>
</ul>
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During the event, BEMOSA researchers will present the groundbreaking results of the research and will discuss the impact and possible applications of the results with various key experts from stakeholder organizations.<br />
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The BEMOSA concluding event is specifically designed to meet the needs of airport security professionals, airport management officials, human resources and operations, providers of airport security services and technology, providers of airport security training services, public officials and policy makers.<br />
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BEMOSA’s key scientific team will analyze the study’s findings with a focus on the key components affecting security decision-making that will encompass group decisions, informal social networks and deviations from rules and procedures. It will also provide some background about the methodology of the study itself, including the scalability and transferability of the methodology.<br />
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The capstone conference will be held in the offices of DG Research of the European Commission in Building CDMA room SDR2, Rue du Champs de Mars 21. The event is free of charge, but registration is obligatory.<br />
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You can register either through this <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/66-invitation-for-the-bemosa-capstone-conference-applications-implications-of-human-factors-on-airport-security" target="_blank">link</a>, or by sending an email to <a href="mailto:bemosa@bemosa.eu">bemosa@bemosa.eu</a>.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-9938155479654927162012-10-16T05:53:00.002-07:002012-10-16T05:56:48.257-07:00The US presidential elections and selective airport securityBy Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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The upcoming US presidential elections and the Republican National Convention approval of a platform calling on privatizing the <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/" target="_blank">Transportation Security Administration (TSA)</a> have placed into stark contrast two opposing points of view of how airport security should be organized, maintained and operated.<br />
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But, as they are both couched in terms of ideology, we are faced with an empirical issue that has never been systematically tested, namely which perspective can produce results that will match what the visionaries of the future airport are looking for?<br />
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As ideological perspectives they both suffer from a number of deficiencies that can be simply called “selective facts.” The more scientific term is closer to “cognitive dissonance” where two contending sets of facts force the individual to ignore or place more weight on one set in favor of the other so as to maintain a degree of behavioral consistency. For those who smoke, for example, the fact that cigarette smoking kills is countered by another fact that “everyone dies” as justification for continuing smoking.<br />
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This also applies to privatizing airports or keeping them under public scrutiny when “a priori” ideology acts as a prism for the choice of facts to accept and those to ignore.<br />
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And what are the facts? This becomes a moot point as “facts” can be selective depending on the particular ideology one prefers. But there remains a light at the end of the tunnel that should provide the discerning reader with a picture of reality of airport security and not based on ideologically selective facts. I am referring to the recent <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA project</a> examining European airports across the continent which was inclusive of both the land and air aspects of airports.<br />
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The results of the BEMOSA study reflect a broad picture of airport security operations based on examining employees and passengers across an entire airport’s organizational structure and staff.<br />
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The picture provided was of the airport as a complex social organization with a variety of security behaviors that do not fit into the airport’s highly regulated, rule-dominated security system. Bending, breaking, and even going against the rules, frequently occur. Trusting technology affects whether employees follow rules or ignore them. False alarms are the name of the game.<br />
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In short, the BEMOSA description and analysis of behavior in airports shows us that there is no “zero-sum” game in airport security and that the present security system on paper does not exist in reality. And, yet, airports continue to grow and function.<br />
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What this suggests is that airports are really both private and public organizations. There are the security rules and protocols dictated by the public authorities (the TSA), but embedded in the security system are employees whose organizational security behavior reflects private bottom-line survival needs linked to adaptation and flexibility when the situation calls for it. In short, there is no ideal airport.<br />
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If these are the empirical (and not ideological) facts, what can be made of the opposing perspectives to enhancing airport security but simultaneously keeping us, the passengers, happy and the bad guys at bay? Should airports be given the ability to determine what is best for its particular needs or should we continue the public-associated oversight in place today?<br />
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As both exist within an airport’s organizational structure, it really comes down to a decision about balance – how much weight will be given to rules and regulations against how much flexibility will be allowed for employees in making judgment calls? That will be the true test toward developing airport security as envisioned for the future.<br />
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*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-17969372457076991142012-10-03T03:41:00.000-07:002012-10-03T03:41:07.226-07:00Airport Security: One Fit for All?<br />
By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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In recent months, major security agencies governing the propagation of airport security rules, regulations and protocols have been under pressure to modify a few of the more invasive and annoying rules at security check points. This, of course, was not to make passengers feel better but more likely in consideration of “bottom line” finances. Angry passengers vote with their feet to either put off additional flights or choose alternative ways to get where they want to go. This hurts business, which is exactly what airports are.<br />
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One of the many ways to increase business is to ease the flow-through of passengers. This leads to reduced costs in flight delays and adds more time to purchase items at the airport mall, and, of course, can be more cost effective by increasing the utilization of security personnel per passenger “unit.”<br />
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But the idea of easing passenger flow requires understanding of both the rationale for the rules and regulations, as well as how security employees make use/or not of these rules for making security decisions. As this requires a substantial investment in basic research, the law of minimum effort comes into play.<br />
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One result has been that leading spokespersons for various agencies have been touting the idea that it is advisable to move from the “one rule fits all” to a more flexible position that would differentiate between passengers. This requires minimum effort and cost; and so we now have programs such as “trusted traveler,” and modifying checks on “young children,” as well as other marginal measures as a way of getting people through the system.<br />
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But the basic security guidelines imprinted in security employees training regimes remain in place and are utilized – upon penalty of dismissal – for just about everyone.<br />
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For passengers and even security employees, the security rites of passage seem to be nearly identical from airport to airport. But why should anyone be surprised? Airports are engineering marvels that use the most highly sophisticated tools to get us from one place to another. What is missing is that the “plan” assumes employees and passengers will act rationally. Big mistake there!<br />
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As the results of the first in-depth study of European airports conducted by the EU-funded <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA research project</a> demonstrated, not only do passengers not always act rationally but to some extent employees do not either. The study, which was based on 360 interviews held at eight different European airports, found, for instance, that one of the biggest headaches for security employees are rowdy/drunk passengers.<br />
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For security managers a troubling phenomenon is the repeated occurrences where the rules and regulations are bent, broken and even ignored; where false alarms are assumed whenever an “incident” such as unattended baggage occurs.<br />
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But despite the similarity in physical configuration and security rules and regulations across airports, the behavioral patterns of both passengers and security employees actually vary from airport to airport. An analysis of the informal social and communications networks among the eight airports studied – a key component that reflects the actual inner workings of any organization – was found to differ substantially. Even levels of rule compliance differed!<br />
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Simply put, “one fit for all” does not come close to describing passenger and employee behaviors despite all the efforts to impose them on employees and passengers by physical and administrative means.<br />
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And so, despite the facts, the overall perspective of “one rule fits all” still remains a cornerstone of airport security and is generally applied to all airports. There are of course very good reasons for imposing standardized measures on airport security so that stringent rules governing procedures and protocols are in place and maintained. In fact, an airport’s certification is contingent upon fulfilling them.<br />
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But a closer examination of these standards shows that they are primarily focused on the physical security of airports. Little or no mention is made of people – neither passengers nor employees. Technology will provide us with the answers.<br />
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Not surprising, this attitude may be the Achille’s heel of airport security. Whichever way you turn, security decisions, however automated they may be, are still in the hands of security employees! Someone has to interpret the machines output. This was clearly found in the BEMOSA results where decisions at security points (screeners) depended on the degree to which employees trust security technology.<br />
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If the technology was seen as the best way to catch “bad guys,” decisions complied with the rules. But, if technology was seen as one (of many) alternatives to thwarting a threat, then compliance was much more relaxed with bending and breaking rules more commonplace.<br />
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Now let’s look at the issue of “one fit for all” from the passengers’ perspective: a viewpoint which does not make too much sense. Passengers come in all kinds of shapes and forms; they enter/exit the airport in groups, by family or alone. They are frequent or first-time flyers, tourists or business persons. Some get nervous at seeing all the armed guards and police; some know the routine, while others need help.<br />
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Yet, the security system lumps them all together as cogs in the mass production system designed by engineers to help them “flow” through the maze of airport security. Disregarding them as both individuals and possessing a variety of cultural, religious and social values that affect their behavior and responses (basically dehumanizing them) simply misses the point that “one fit for all” will not work. It is a formula for creating sometimes intractable problems. And this is exactly what happens.<br />
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A careful examination of the screening process shows this to be the case. The time it takes for passengers to get through this basic checkup can more or less be predicted by their cultural and social background characteristics as well as the type of flyers they are.<br />
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A first-time flyer (for example, a tourist from a country where negotiating is part of the national culture) will likely object when the screeners find a bottle of “spirits” in a carry-on bag. Negotiations will begin; time will pass; the queue will get longer and perhaps even a confrontation will occur. Why? The rules don’t accommodate for these culturally based differences. Knowing that negotiations are likely to occur can be anticipated and dealt with. Being deaf and not responding can lead to an escalation of the situation.<br />
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Here again, by discarding the “one fit for all” notion, simple solutions are possible. It takes little effort to understand that the characteristics of passengers in a specific airport are to a large degree unique. Small regional airports attract local populations which may be fairly homogeneous, while hub airports are filled with persons from a multi-cultural and social background mix.<br />
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Security employees could go beyond their rule compliance training to incorporate sensitivity to these differences and focus their efforts on the human factor to avoid “flow-through” difficulties.<br />
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In fact, it probably is already being done. The BEMOSA project discovered that security employee compliance with the rules and regulations varied by airport. Why would this be so? One could speculate that it is probably because security employees have adapted their security behaviors to match the passenger population characteristics that flow through the airport. This of course needs further analysis, but from corroborating interviews and ethnographic material, it seems a very likely scenario.<br />
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If this is the case, the “one fit for all” slogan, which is the natural outcome of those who view airports as mass processing units, has missed its target. Our research has clearly demonstrated this probability. By accepting the “one fit for all,” credo policy makers have unfortunately left behind the key components to airport viability and continuity, namely the employees and passengers – the human factor.<br />
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This factor, people, is what makes each airport a unique organization. It also requires that the security process within each be examined within its own cultural, economic and social framework. To lump all airports together misses the point.<br />
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It is highly recommended that each airport conduct its own internal security audit based on the guidelines provided by BEMOSA. This can provide airports with a clear picture of the main issues its security personnel are facing and how they differ from other airports.<br />
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Once such research is carried out, a detailed working plan can be drafted leading to an improvement in overall security and, no less important, a reduction in costs.<br />
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Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum from the Technion Institute of Technology in Israel, is a world expert in disaster management and initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA.<br />
BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-79046252044351189282012-08-16T01:52:00.001-07:002012-08-16T01:58:50.977-07:00Do the informal social networks in airports affect security judgments?How far do social networks and informal interactions affect the judgments made by airport security personnel during times of crisis? Quite a lot, according to recent research carried out by an international team of specialists in security matters. They say that informal social networks in airports are just as powerful as the formal set of rules and guidelines laid out in specific security directives.<br />
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The groundbreaking research, which was published recently in the <a href="https://springerlink3.metapress.com/content/m5w024768934376m/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=hqlwee5p1fhcgizjdnkvh553&sh=www.springerlink.com" target="_blank">Journal of Transportation Security</a>, was carried out by <a href="http://www.alankirschenbaum.com/" target="_blank"><b>Alan Avi Kirschenbaum</b></a>, <b>Michele Mariani</b>, <b>Coen Van Gulijk</b>, <b>Carmit Rapaport</b> and <b>Sharon Lubasz</b> and is based on survey data collected from a sample of airport employees in several European Airports, as part of the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA Project</a>.<br />
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During their analysis of the findings, the team noted that both formal and informal sources of security information have an impact on the employee’s decisions to comply with the security rules and directives. This is especially noticeable during times of crisis.<br />
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The research found that alongside the formal administrative structure of airports, there also exists “a diverse and pervasiveness set of informal communications networks that are a potent factor in determining airport security levels.”<br />
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“These two work in tandem and both serve as conduits for the selective flow of information that will ultimately affect airport security,” researchers wrote in the article.<br />
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“An airport can no longer be solely viewed as a strictly formal organization governing the security behavior of its employees by imposing administrative directives,” they said. “Rules and protocols are being bent, broken and disregarded.”<br />
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And they added: “Apparently there is a vibrant set of informal social networks in airports that provides alternative paths for accessing information and, more importantly directly influence the degree that the security protocols will be followed.”<br />
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The article describes airports as “complex social organizations,” characterized, for the most part, as having strong formal social structures that bolster the legal set of administrative rules that affect operational maintenance and continuity. However, little attention is paid to the rich fabric of informal networks that also play a critical role in airport management.<br />
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This, say the researchers, is a mistake because both formal and informal structures in airports are important.<br />
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“In cases when a security decision needs to be made, it would seem that formal sources of information — given its legal and administrative prerogative — should marginalize information generated through informal social networks. Yet, recent ethnographic evidence has shown that informal social interactions in airports are alive and have an impact on group based security decisions making, along with a great deal of bending and even breaking the rules,” they write.<br />
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While it is still not clear to what extent such informal sources of information impact on security decisions, the new research raises serious questions as to the veracity of official formal sources as the sole determining factor is such decisions.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-68232834627048330242012-07-23T07:36:00.000-07:002012-08-15T07:46:49.979-07:00London Olympics security: how to manage visitors and employees?By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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With the <a href="http://www.london2012.com/" target="_blank">London 2012 Summer Olympics</a> just around the corner, a great deal has been written and said about security. Missiles on rooftops, army troops patrolling streets and 35-40,000 people involved in securing the Olympics games against worse case scenarios.<br />
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<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxmX16c6Djuhukx_DSXD8Ch3f_-ITkjGhcyUrz9Dez-DiEfIgewOPUVrwHvJQ_qrfzI5xc4BmuboaSf4qL7RkaRMpaTHn6weeGMUgi7EP6Fe_y6voe2E5ZmAZePtjTKRoBiKcT-OPi3k87/s1600/London2012.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="112" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxmX16c6Djuhukx_DSXD8Ch3f_-ITkjGhcyUrz9Dez-DiEfIgewOPUVrwHvJQ_qrfzI5xc4BmuboaSf4qL7RkaRMpaTHn6weeGMUgi7EP6Fe_y6voe2E5ZmAZePtjTKRoBiKcT-OPi3k87/s200/London2012.jpg" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: xx-small;">Source:
<span style="background-color: white; text-align: right;">London 2012 Olympic site</span></span></td></tr>
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The underlying fear of a repeat 40 years later of the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes surely hangs over those who are managing security. But in all the discussions about the various scenarios of terror and managerial blunders do we hear about the fact that security at the Games will be guided by the model utilized in airports. This model of airport security is carefully crafted by rules, regulations and protocols that will guide employees in their security decisions. Just follow the rules and everything will be fine!<br />
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However, such faith may be misplaced. In fact, a warning red light should begin flashing. The <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA Project</a> is the main culprit: it found the reality of security decision making in airports to differ from the ideal; where bending the rules is commonplace, not trusting security technology endemic and most threats considered as false alarms. But perhaps the airport type security at the London Olympics will be different?<br />
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Let us consider this possibility. Unlike stable airports continuity, the Olympics will be concentrated in a fairly "short" time period. This might preclude the possibility of making adaptive managerial and shop-floor changes in tandem with fluid developments in the security situation.<br />
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Creating contingency plans take this possibility into consideration. But the basic flaw remains; it is designed to resemble airport security. Security managers and security employees will be expected to abide by the rules and protocols. The basic assumption built into this perspective will remain the same – engineering and logistics that treats people as simply cogs in a complex production unit. Once the reality of the Games visitors and employees behavior supersedes the carefully thought out plans, problems will arise that may not fit into the neat security protocol package.<br />
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What can we expect to happen? Again let us look at what the BEMOSA project found in airports. Long queues, frustrated visitors, over-worked security employees! But more importantly we will see how front line 'shop floor' employees will soon be adapting to the situations; yes! Bending and breaking the rules. Finding solutions and implementing them on the spot. These security employees face reality and are forced to make on the spot assessments given the many constraints they face; in particular the actual behavior of visitors facing them at security checks. <br />
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This will not likely be the case for security managers as their task is to uphold the administrative rules and regulations. This may breed a situation where there will likely be a gap between their perception of what is happening "on the ground" and the 'shop floor' employees understanding. This also fits in nicely with one of the many findings of BEMOSA, namely that the most frequent complaint of 'shop-floor' security employees is that managers do not listen to their suggestions about what "really" happens and especially their proposed solutions.<br />
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If airport security models are the basis for the Olympic Games security, senior security managers should be well advised of what to expect. You simply cannot control either security employees or visitors behavior by the imposition of a rule framework that does not take into account the 'human factor'. <br />
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*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports)</a>.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-84063628034298313702012-07-19T06:35:00.000-07:002012-08-15T06:45:33.465-07:00BEMOSA's workshop suggests adding simulation scenarios to training programsDid you know that there are three typical employee profiles that determine how and airport workers make key security decisions?<br />
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Well, according to information collected by the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports) Project</a>, most airport security personnel fall into one of three categories and responses to security threats are determined by these traits.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPTBzy5rT_SezhhU7mPAhC09pNZwfr2q_1Ao2mJ39vo7eOJXNZfAQ3TM2d34TIcWB_LiUp3hh7yecJWOTdjL_6VNFjY6Qd_d6yDgCHo2DrBnSzrNlcuRR0jXr4NJnOWf_vERylJoB2yTqC/s1600/Airport+Security+Worker.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="96" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPTBzy5rT_SezhhU7mPAhC09pNZwfr2q_1Ao2mJ39vo7eOJXNZfAQ3TM2d34TIcWB_LiUp3hh7yecJWOTdjL_6VNFjY6Qd_d6yDgCHo2DrBnSzrNlcuRR0jXr4NJnOWf_vERylJoB2yTqC/s200/Airport+Security+Worker.jpg" width="200" /></a>The project, which is now looking at how to turn its extensive research of airport security personnel into a comprehensive training program to enhance airport security, notes that the first profile is the "adaptive" employee, who tends to bend and break the rules. The second is the "social based decision maker," who nearly always consults with someone before making a decision, and the third, the "compliant bureaucratic decision maker," strictly follows and complies with the rules and regulations.<br />
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Using these guidelines, as well as additional research into the critical components in the decision-making process, the BEMOSA team recently held a one-day <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2012/06/aviation-security-training-program.html" target="_blank">workshop</a> to lay down the basic guidelines for a training program.<br />
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At the workshop, the team highlighted that the overall goals are to “close the gap between knowledge and actual performance, preserve new and tacit experienced based knowledge, as well as support the airports organizational objectives.”<br />
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Together they examined how key findings, such as the tendency for group-based security decisions, could and should be introduced into any new training program. They also looked at the role of technology and trust of security machines plays a critical part in making decisions. It was pointed out that because airport security relies so heavily on technology, any sort of training program must address the issue of trust in technology.<br />
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Those at the workshop also suggested that sophisticated simulation scenarios, with group based training formats, should also have a place in any sort of training program. In that way, employees could be presented with a number of scenarios based on their profiles and have their responses assessed accordingly. This will enhance their security decision-making abilities.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-13801347062073523452012-07-12T09:44:00.003-07:002012-07-12T09:53:12.628-07:00New resarch of ‘Underwear bomber’ sheds light on complexities of airport security<div>
By Dr. Coen van Gulijk</div>
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<span style="background-color: white;">A new case study developed by <a href="http://tbm.tudelft.nl/en/about-faculty/departments/values-and-technology/ssg-section/" target="_blank">Safety Science group</a> at the Delft University of Technology focusing in detail on the lead-up to a Christmas Day of terror in 2009 sheds light on the complexities and barriers of airport security.</span></div>
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Developed by Ph.D candidate Hinke Andriessen and financed by the<a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank"> BEMOSA (Behaviour Modelling for Security in Airports)</a> consortium with an EU Grant, the case study will be used to enhance security education. Students in a variety of disciplines, including safety science, security, criminology, complex transport systems and human factors, will be able to benefit from its insights.<br />
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The study is based on a young Nigerian Muslim, who quickly became known worldwide as the Christmas Terror Bomber. Twenty-three year old Umar Faroush Abdulmuttab tried unsuccessfully to blow up a North Western Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit that safely landed in the US on Christmas Day, 2009.</div>
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Despite the safe landing, the case study asks how Abdulmuttab managed to board two different international flights, pass security checks in Africa and Europe and fail to set off any of the global warning mechanisms in place, even though he was on a US watch list and while he was carrying substances that could be potentially fatal. </div>
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The study, which is examines the story chronologically and includes newspaper articles and eyewitness testimonies, shows that securing air transport is a complex problem. </div>
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First, says the author, air travel is international. She points out that not only were there 27 different nationalities on board flight NW 253 but also Abdulmuttab’s trip included stops in four nations: Ghana, Nigeria, and Amsterdam to America. In addition, attempts to ignite the bomb took place in Canadian airspace. </div>
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Secondly, the security barriers installed worldwide to detect suspected passengers do not always perform in the way in the way they are supposed to. In this case the use of several databases failed to identify Abdulmuttab as a terrorist, several detectors failed to identify the bomb, and he was not singled out by security staff. </div>
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Third, risk detection, as an activity for air transport, is a complex matter. It depends on technology and interconnected systems sharing information but the there is an important role for the human to interpret the analyses. Additionally, a bomb is just one of many ways in which air transport can be threatened by terrorists. </div>
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Fourth, with an increasing number of security barriers, it becomes harder to manage them as a coherent system and while international legislation forms the backbone for management putting it into action is no easy feat.</div>
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According to the case study’s authors, this incident forces us to rethink security for global air traffic. That a suspected terrorist was able to travel halfway round the world with a bomb, interact with stewardesses, evade being caught by security staff, able to lie to a profiler and travel with hundreds of fellow travellers raises many new issues in airport security. Despite the failures of technology, the plane did not explode because of the actions of alertness of passengers. </div>
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In conclusion, the authors point out that this case demonstrates that we should take human factors more seriously in airport security. Any willing person can contribute to security. Maybe, in addition to watching the X-ray screen for explosives the security officer should watch the passenger. After defining the passenger as suspicious he can check his bags. After that, any staff on airports and passengers alike could be instruments for security. They can be trained to recognize threats, talk with their colleagues, act when required and call security when they do not trust the situation. </div>
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“Human behavior and decision-making processes are elements of human factors that, when properly trained and applied, can increase the level of security in air transport,” concludes the study.<br />
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The case study was performed by Hinke Andriessen and she was supervised by Coen van Gulijk, both work for the BEMOSA project. </div>BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-56393124260085134302012-07-02T02:45:00.000-07:002012-10-03T03:08:19.602-07:00TSA sleeping on the job<span style="background-color: white;">By <a href="http://www.alankirschenbaum.com/" target="_blank">Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum</a>*</span><br />
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And now the firings are happening at <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2012/06/florida-airports-tsa-firings.html" target="_blank">another</a> airport! <a href="http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/TSA-Airport-Screeners-Fired-Newark-Sleeping-on-Job-Checked-Bags-160584585.html" target="_blank">This time</a> security employees at Newark Airport were caught on video “sleeping on the job or failing to follow standard operating procedures for screening checked bags.”<br />
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Nothing surprising here about not complying with the rules – recall the results of the BEMOSA findings where bending, breaking and even going against the rules was commonplace!<br />
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But what should interest <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2012/06/aviation-security-training-program.html" target="_blank">security and airport managers</a> is the charge of “sleeping on the job.” While the details are not available, could it be that employees were” resting” in between flight arrivals/departures when no bags were in need of examination, or was it during actual periods of baggage flow?<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgU_wGvgTSz_dJ1gbmOcyGqeWhfJS06mVRKDyttTj7Iq1yE1h5tLahcYa0VgkFtQjVNXRoyT294rZYHIt-qzHBBTLf_L0yedL8sijcpHW4_2ANpRs7nKgzd44QgOkE3d3ju7UXNRpVQkD33/s1600/security_employees.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="125" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgU_wGvgTSz_dJ1gbmOcyGqeWhfJS06mVRKDyttTj7Iq1yE1h5tLahcYa0VgkFtQjVNXRoyT294rZYHIt-qzHBBTLf_L0yedL8sijcpHW4_2ANpRs7nKgzd44QgOkE3d3ju7UXNRpVQkD33/s200/security_employees.jpg" width="200" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white;">More likely they utilized what we discovered in the </span><a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" style="background-color: white;" target="_blank">BEMOSA</a><span style="background-color: white;"> ethnographic study as an effective system of work performance where employees paired into “idle-active” small groups, rotating from active to idle that allowed each employee to gain needed physical/mental rest from a stressful but routine job. This allowed the partner to be fully focused on his/her job when in active mode.</span><br />
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Let me put this into perspective: employees refer to these types of jobs as “being bored out your mind.” We are talking about routine jobs where the perceived probability of something terrible happening is extremely low. And this is how most airport employees see threats, mainly as false alarms and not likely to happen.<br />
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In our case of baggage handlers, checking inanimate lifeless bags constantly flowing by on a conveyor belt – picture Charlie Chapman in Modern Times – and making rule-based security decisions based on the technology (which most do not trust); where an alarm would mean stopping the flow, opening bags and/or recalling the passenger for a security interview (all at a price and underlying threat of being dismissed if too many false alarms are made!) could certainly justify employees going into the “idle-active” mode.<br />
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Until those who watched the “big brother” cameras and caught the “dissident workers,” the flow of bags and security levels seemed to work just fine.<br />
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So will firing baggage handlers who “sleep on the job” lead to increased airport security? Very doubtful. But putting more stress and pressure on employees to comply with the rules without taking into consideration the social work environment and adaptive ability of workers to cope with such work conditions, the outcomes will likely lead to more mistakes, more human errors and reduced security. So instead of firing them, perhaps it might have been a better idea to learn from them! <br />
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The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).*<br />
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<b>Related Articles</b><br />
<a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2012/06/florida-airports-tsa-firings.html" target="_blank">Florida airport’s TSA firings send workers the wrong message</a><br />
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<a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2012/03/drunk-unruly-passengers-major-challenge.html" target="_blank">Drunk, unruly passengers major challenge for airport security personnel</a><br />
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<b>Related Workshops</b><br />
<a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/62-3rd-bemosa-structured-workshop-agenda-announced" style="background-color: white;" target="_blank">Open workshop On airport security</a><br />
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BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-21867843863720443432012-06-19T09:47:00.000-07:002012-08-15T06:43:42.556-07:00BEMOSA's next workshop to focus on aviation security training program for airport personnel<span style="background-color: white;">The <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA consortium</a> will hold a special workshop in Brussels on July 10, 2012 focusing on the managerial implications of the intermediate findings of <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/48-introduction" target="_blank">extensive research conducted in European airports</a>.</span><br />
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The workshop is the third and last workshop in a series of events devoted to applying human factor and the principles of social networking to airport security. At the <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2012/03/human-factor-in-airport-security.html" target="_blank">first workshop</a> the general conclusions of the study were presented. At the <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2012/04/airport-security-management-and.html" target="_blank">second workshop</a> specific case studies have been provided and discussed, especially their implications for airport security operations in general and false alarms and manager-employee relations in particular.<br />
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<span style="background-color: white;">The <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/62-3rd-bemosa-structured-workshop-agenda-announced" target="_blank">third workshop</a> will discuss the implication of the findings of BEMOSA in daily airport management and training programs on enhancing security decisions by airport employees.</span><br />
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The workshop will focus on translating the groundbreaking findings into guidelines for a novel training program for airport personnel. The training program will be based upon unique behaviour models developed by BEMOSA.<br />
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The BEMOSA evidence-based simulation and training program will eventually lead to reduced false alarms, increased passenger satisfaction and improved labor relations, ultimately leading to improved profitability.<br />
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The workshop will be held in the offices of DG Research of the European Commission in Rue du Champs de Mars 21 in Brussels. The event is free of charge but <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/61-3rd-bemosa-structured-workshop-invitation-and-registration" target="_blank">registration</a> is obligatory.<br />
<br />BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-30642779258414526922012-06-07T04:55:00.002-07:002012-06-07T05:04:11.993-07:00Florida airport’s TSA firings send workers the wrong messageBy Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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The latest episode of being negatively rewarded for not following airport security rules has hit the headlines once again with<a href="http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2012-06-04/TSA-disciplines-43-screeners-over-lax-security/55384154/1" target="_blank"> reports</a> on the firing of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) workers at Southwest Florida International Airport for failing to perform random screenings.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-PvAn3W2Bdr0Df9n9XY9shpTB__J9o85gUkzmVAV3OjWLePsjw9wvNXXi0wCAO-_t3RAgnDPEHR7PpApejoiVuwVFCnuoirhibplgyiPsq-oQCdMLjezESOGVIYtTMQItb0y6w5E_z4o-/s1600/SFIA.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-PvAn3W2Bdr0Df9n9XY9shpTB__J9o85gUkzmVAV3OjWLePsjw9wvNXXi0wCAO-_t3RAgnDPEHR7PpApejoiVuwVFCnuoirhibplgyiPsq-oQCdMLjezESOGVIYtTMQItb0y6w5E_z4o-/s1600/SFIA.jpg" /></a></div>
This, of course, will lead to security being tightened, not out of concern for aircraft and passenger safety but out of fear of being fired. The result: longer lines, more frustrated passengers and loss of revenue for airports.<br />
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So what is the big fuss about if, as TSA spokesman David Castelveter said, “It’s the random secondary that did not happen. At no time was a traveler’s safety at risk and there was no impact on flight operations”? The logic of this somehow escapes me, but it does point toward an inherent problem in how security is viewed and practiced.<br />
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Just as we <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2011/06/adaptive-airport-employee.html" target="_blank">found</a> in the <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA Project</a>, bending, breaking and ignoring the rules is part of the normative behavior of security employees. In this case, only 15 percent of the roughly 280 TSA employees at an airport were caught and either fired or suspended. And what was the reason? They did not perform “random checks” of the passengers which, as we have heard, do nothing to enhance security but might make it “a little more difficult” for the bad guys to disrupt air transportation. Of course, this begs the question of “how much more difficult” as against decimating your work force and increasing the frustration of passengers.<br />
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Here again we see the overdone imposition of rules as against the judgment and experience of security personnel. Rather than imbed and enrich employees with skills that go far beyond what technology or its related rules can offer, we are sending the message to “keep a low profile,” “don't rock the boat,” “don't take initiative” – just be the robot the engineers and security managers have designed you to be.<br />
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And why is this critical to making security decisions?<br />
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By treating passengers as sterile cogs who are seen as a threat, we logically must apply the engineering model of airports designed as a mass production high risk facility (akin to a prison). But what if we start to view airports as service providers where passengers are customers?<br />
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Well, not unexpectedly, the <a href="http://bemosa.blogspot.co.il/2011/06/adaptive-airport-employee.html" target="_blank">BEMOSA results</a> have revealed an important clue. Those security employees who considered the security and safety of passengers to be high on their priority list were the ones who tended to bend and break the rules. Those who really didn’t care that much about passengers were the compliant bureaucratic rule keepers.<br />
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Just ask yourself: to whom would you rather trust your lives?<br />
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The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).*BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-67006636258724304872012-04-23T06:29:00.001-07:002012-08-15T07:22:57.780-07:00BEMOSA's next workshop to focus on airport security management and trainingThe <a href="http://bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA consortium</a> will hold a special workshop in Brussels, Belgium on May 15, 2012 on the managerial implications of the intermediate findings of extensive research conducted in European airports.
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The workshop is specifically designed to meet the needs of airport security professionals, airport management officials, human resources and operations personnel, providers of airport security services and technology, providers of airport security training services, public officials and policy makers.<br />
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The workshop is the second in a series of workshops devoted to applying human factors and the principles of social networking to airport security. The workshops will discuss the basic <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/48-introduction" target="_blank">findings</a> of BEMOSA, their implications on daily airport management and training programs to enhance security decisions by airport employees.<br />
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At the first workshop the general conclusions of the Study of Airports were presented; at the second specific case studies will be provided and discussed, especially their implications for, among others, airport security operations in general and false alarms and manager-employee relations in particular.<br />
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The unique behaviour models developed by BEMOSA will be applied to the case studies as well, and will form the basis for the development of a novel training program for airport personnel.<br />
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BEMOSA’s researchers will analyze the study’s findings with a focus on group decisions, informal social networks and deviations from rules and procedures.<br />
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The workshop will be held in the offices of DG Research of the European Commission in Rue du Champs de Mars 21 in Brussels. The event is free of charge but <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/49-invitation-for-a-structured-series-of-workshops-on-airport-security" target="_blank">registration</a> is obligatory.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-9231029208924069622012-04-11T02:46:00.000-07:002012-08-15T07:23:57.332-07:00TSA critics aim at the wrong goalBy Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*<br />
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In soccer and other sports, we have occasionally witnessed the anguish of a player making a “self goal.” It appears that some of the critics of the <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/" target="_blank">Transportation Security Administration (TSA)</a>, charging it with <a href="http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2012-03-27/Lawmakers-call-airport-screeners-ineffective-rude/53798262/1" target="_blank">“ineffective tactics and treating travelers rudely,”</a> are really saying the obvious to all of us who have gone through security screening. Nothing new here! So why all the fuss about how we feel as passengers going through security screening? Remember, these are politicians talking!<br />
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So let’s look at this criticism in more detail and really get down to the core of the security issue for passengers. And, don’t forget, airport security not only includes passengers but cargo, maintenance, outsourced employees and, not surprisingly, the shops and malls. But for the moment let us focus on passengers as potential voters – for politicians on election day and also as customers who can choose (or not) to fly certain airlines and select airports.<br />
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How do passengers fit into the flying game? To answer this it is important to distinguish airports as a flow-through production which has recently been transformed into a large shopping mall and hotel complex that happens to be serviced by aircraft. Simply put, a supermarket found within a factory. Despite this transformation, airport design remains based on industrial engineering principles and “bottom line” results – and security based on technology. Perhaps it’s time for a reevaluation?<br />
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As most airports are private enterprises, profits are a driving force that also has direct implications on determining how airport security will be framed. As a production unit, this has meant getting us through the security process as quickly as possible, spending more time at the shops (a money generator), and minimizing flight delays (also very costly). However, despite the rational and logical designs, passengers are still getting annoyed and angry.<br />
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But viewing airports as a service organization, airport managers would seek to attract us to use their services by making security as flexible as possible. This would minimize “friction” and simultaneously increase passenger flow with entry into the shopping mall made as effortlessly as possible thereby increasing purchases of goods and services. In other words, good business.<br />
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There is no getting away from the fact that passengers are the key component in making airports profitable. Security screening as it is today, whichever way you look at it, does not make many customers happy. The result can easily bring about (and has, according to a recent US report) a large loss of customers and revenue.<br />
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What can be done? Lots! Making the passenger happy starts with the simple interaction of security guards and passengers.<br />
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The <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA Project</a> has demonstrated that in many cases security guards are focal points for information and help, bending and even breaking the mandated rules if the situation calls for it which, in the eyes of the passenger, makes sense. It’s a difficult job for security employees, but if included in their training are some of the basics of “customer service,” not only will the employees be rewarded by more friendly passengers-customers but the bottom line profits of airports will rise. Result: happy customers and many happy airport shareholders.<br />
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*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8369769478855951597.post-37744020378812925992012-03-27T00:44:00.001-07:002012-03-27T00:51:28.706-07:00Drunk, unruly passengers major challenge for airport security personnelDrunken or unruly passengers are among the biggest challenges facing airport security personnel and account for the majority of emergency incidents in airports, the preliminary findings of a recent study conducted by the EU-funded <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/" target="_blank">BEMOSA (Behaviour Modelling for Security in Airports) consortium</a>, has revealed.<br />
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Based on some 360 interviews of security personnel in eight European airports, researchers found that most major security infractions related to confiscation of illegal items and dealing with wayward passengers that were either inebriated or overly aggressive.<br />
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A compilation of all reported incidents shared with BEMOSA researchers showed that out of 369 events, 131 stemmed from passengers carrying prohibited articles such as knives, guns and ammunition and 90 involved unruly and disruptive people, most of whom were drunk. It was these incidents that caused the most disruption to security procedures and often staff needed assistance from co-workers or the police when dealing with intoxicated passengers.<br />
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“The results illustrate the complexity of actual behaviour in airports,” commented <b><a href="http://www.alankirschenbaum.com/" target="_blank">Professor Alan Kirschenbaum</a></b>, a world expert in disaster management from Haifa’s <b>Technion University</b> and BEMOSA’s initiator and coordinator.<br />
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“There is a definite need to improve security decision-making abilities as there is a gap between procedures and actual behaviour when a threat is recognized,” he added. “Security decisions tend to be inconsistent as employees regard most threats as false alarms, have never faced a real threat and have pre-biased estimates of what constitutes a threat.”<br />
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The report’s findings also indicate that airport employees often do not rely on procedures or rules and more than one-third of those interviewed admitted bending the rules when the situation called for it. The interviews also revealed that employees’ concerns are not perceived to be terror related but are primarily connected to passengers.<br />
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The full results of BEMOSA’s study has been presented at a <a href="http://www.bemosa.eu/news/item/1-bemosa-announces-a-structured-series-of-workshops-on-airport-security" target="_blank">special workshop</a> in Brussels on March 19, 2012 in the offices of DG Research of the European Commission on Rue du Champs de Mars 21.BEMOSAhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04788046875370875137noreply@blogger.com0