Gatwick’s new security plan ignores the human factor

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

It is always a miracle when plans are actually implemented and even more astonishing if they work. The evidence we have is that they rarely do so.

The new security plan announced by Gatwick Airport calling for speedier passage by providing more “lanes” for passenger flow is a typical engineering solution. These solutions have been used for toll bridges, tunnels and highways for years and now we have them at airports.

Security area in South Terminal

Underneath the “make passengers happy” mantra is the aim to increase passenger flow and reduce waiting time. Absolutely great ideas, except that passengers have a way of not following the rules. And it is here that the idea that 5,000 passengers per hour will happily move along through the multi-colored security lanes according to the engineering tune falls apart.

The assumptions made about us as passengers (note: not people) – in what airport managers think of as a mass production factory – disregard the basic variety of behaviors associated with individuals, family units and groups that are thrust into an unfamiliar high risk security environment where threats are made every day.

By leaving the choice of “lane” open to the discretion of the passenger, and basing that choice on media instructions, is one of many fatal flaws in what could have been a better human factor-designed security system.

To make sure 5,000 people get through the security screening every hour assumes everyone is a good and well-informed citizen – an assumption that totally ignores the reality of people’s behaviors.

What is even more disturbing is that it ignores the reality of what happens every day at airports between security employees and passengers.

One more thing, while adding more color-coded lanes is commendable: what if I’m color blind?


*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Making airport security a service for passengers

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

The latest round of making airports more “passenger friendly” reflects what social scientists have long known about the way organizations adapt its goals and internal means in order to survive. The newest policy changes and pilot studies reflect this attempt. But will they work?

Source: TSA

Fact: airports are people servicing organizations.

Reality: they are still viewed as “mass production” units whose operations are based on industrial production techniques utilizing cutting edge technology.

In terms of security, passengers are viewed as an integral part of the mass production process where effective output relies on tighter “controls!” Passengers are not viewed as people but cogs in a complex machine.

But how do these two opposing views fit into what airport organizational administrators need to do in order to survive?

Today, the answer seems to be a repetition of the mass production perspective! Rather than revamping the airport into a people servicing organization, we see the same reliance on production techniques and “control.”

But people are not cogs in a mass production factory, they are customers who want a service. When this message gets through, perhaps the decision makers will start to think in terms of making security a part of the service package along with duty free malls and parking facilities which are customer oriented and have been proven to be both profitable and attractive.

*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Privacy vs. profiling in airport security

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

As a growing number of North American airports move to using human behavior modeling methods, criticism over the usage of such screening methods is growing.

Jennifer Stoddart

The first to protest was Canadian Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart expressing concern over a government plan to scrutinize the flying public’s behavior at Canadian airports.

This was followed by US Congressman Bennie Thompson, who called for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to halt the implementation of a new behavioral screening program at Boston Logan International Airport. Both Stoddart and Thompson questioned the scientific basis of the plan and expressed concern over related privacy issues.

Anyone who has ever taken Intro Soc or Psych knows that we all profile, otherwise, how would we know whom to marry, in which neighborhood to live, what friends to choose, and to whom to turn when we need a favor!

Similarly, the furor over privacy is really an ideological debate (and its legalistic consequences) rather than a reflection of the same social processes that foster group rather than individual survival through such mechanisms as organizing into family units, community social networks and other types of organizational forms. Group survival has proven itself.

So the fuss about privacy and profiling has very little to do with how people behave and interact in the real world!

Well, it shouldn’t then come as a surprise to anyone that airport security employees profile – the most natural behavioral response when placed in a “survival type” situation where the next passenger might be a suicide bomber! This is no idle statement as there is substantial empirical proof to back this up.

Even passengers’ awareness of the airport security climate seems to illicit the same profiling modes. How can they not be affected when the loud speakers regularly broadcast insistent warnings about not leaving baggage unattended?

So why not just augment an already deeply ingrained behavior in all of us by making profiling a bit more sophisticated (as in the example of the Israeli airport) to enhance the ability of airport personnel to catch the bad guys? What good will your privacy or legal rights be when the bomb goes off?

* The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Statistical Model in Airports Unlikely to Catch Terrorists

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

Engineering researchers at the University of Arkansas have created a statistical model of the daily operations of general aviation airports in order to help show unusual activity that could suggest a security threat, according to a recent report.

The model is based on factors such as annual number of landings and takeoffs; total number of planes based at an airport; whether an airport has a traffic-control tower, and other detailed data.

“We want to understand the variation associated with usual general-aviation activity and operations, so unusual activity can be detected, analyzed and resolved,” said Justin Chimka, associate professor of industrial engineering and a researcher at the rural transportation center.

Catching potential terrorists by monitoring thousands of airport activities and then looking for blips from an artificial “norm” is like discovering a rash on your body (statistically abnormal), then trying to discover its origin, knowing full well that it may have originated from dozens of potential sources.

Anyone familiar with airport operations and the thousands of potential sources for “abnormal activities” will realize that the tunnel vision being promoted by the research supported by the DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security) to monitor airport security may look great on colored graphs (or monitors) but is unlikely to catch the terrorists until it’s too late.

The tunnel vision promoted by a stand-alone engineering or technological approach is simply missing the boat.

As airports are complex social organizations where employees like ourselves are trying their best to maintain continuity of operations in the face of potential security threats, the decisions we make – be they facing passengers or checking suppliers of services – are not based on statistical abnormalities but on those good ole-fashioned human qualities gained through training, experience, and to some extent, gut feelings.

Technology is a tool to help make those decisions, but we have enough research evidence to show that trusting technology and bending the rules are a critical part of the security decision-making process: a very human characteristic.

So, perhaps it may be a good time to start refocusing on people and not on a virtual world of statistical devices in catching the bad guys.

* The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Watching security at the London olympics through an airport prism

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

According to an initial report in The Daily Mail, London Olympic Committee security personnel appear to have taken a page out of airport security protocol in order to smoothly move the tens of thousands of spectators, employees, volunteers, athletes and reporters into the main stadium to watch world records being broken.

Twelve thousand police, 15,000 private security personnel and thousands of CCTV cameras, screeners and scanners will be in place in order screen those entering the stadium, assuring coordinated communications among everyone involved. It is estimated that it will take only 20 minutes to navigate the security checks.

If airport security systems are to act as the framework for the London Olympics, it would be wise for the Olympic Games’ security advisors to look very carefully at some of the current research being generated on airport security.

What has been found is a real eye opener: about a third of security employees regularly bend and even break the rules and procedures when necessary. Two findings are of interest – decisions are not made by individuals but as a group process and communications between security employees run along a parallel informal social network rather than the typical control command chain!

Where does this leave us? If indeed security at the London Olympics will mimic airport security, such non-procedural behaviors must be accounted for or we can expect the same dissatisfaction exhibited by passengers who prefer alternatives to flying when possible.

The London olympic stadium 2012

Security advisors and London police should be thinking of alternative ways to better match the reality of “security-spectator” interaction, something the BEMOSA project has already looked into and is generating some unique solutions.

So, potential Olympic Games goers, be prepared to remove your shoes, belts and get caught up in some nasty pushing matches and frustrating waits, but don’t be so sure you will catch the game!

* The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).