TSA makes the right security decisions for wrong reasons

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

What we are witnessing at the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) these days is typical of all organizations that, for survival purposes, are adapting their goals to the exigencies of external pressures.

Source: TSA

In this case, the TSA has given in to a combination of passenger backlash and potential loss of income for the airline industry. Part of this adaptive process still hinges on viewing airports as assembly lines where passengers are cogs in the manufacturing process.

It is therefore not surprising that some marginal changes are being instituted in security rules and regulations with the purpose of speeding up the flow of “units” by reducing “friction” at check points. And, for the first time, the concept of allowing TSA agents to have discretion in making decisions appears to have been taken on board.

This is a leap forward in thinking that should be praised as it recognizes the reality of security decision making revealed by the BEMOSA project which has shown the prevalence of bending, and even breaking, the rules throughout the airport security system by security agents.

What is promising here is that the TSA is finally beginning to recognize that passengers are not homogeneous cogs flowing through a factory, but represent different population segments. Yes, deal with children and family units differently than single adults; yes, pre-profile passengers by age and background; yes, remove the reactive security measures when judged unnecessary.

All this can be done by allowing greater discretion on the part of security employees to make decisions. It is these activities that will make airports friendlier to passengers and not lower security.

The key to enhanced security still and always will, remain in the hands of airport employees and not machines.

* The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports). The full article has been published in Homeland Security Today.

Man not machinery more decisive in airport security

Prof. Alan Kirschenbaum, initiator and coordinator of the BEMOSA (Behavior Modeling for Security in Airports) Project has reinforced his criticism of the (ITA) International Airport Transport Association’s “Checkpoint of the Future” program in a recent interview with Stephanie Johnson from the Denver International Travel Examiner.

Checkpoint of the Future, which aims to enhance security while reducing queues and intrusive searches at airports by using intelligence-driven risk-based measures, fails to consider the unique make-up of the individual passengers or those individuals working the technology, said Kirschenbaum.

“BEMOSA has discovered a practically unlimited number of potential scenarios in its simulation modeling based on the reality of behaviors we observed,” said Kirschenbaum in the interview. “This means that future training will need to promote proactive and innovative behaviors rather than rote reactions.”

“In addition, all airports are NOT the same due to physical, demographic and cultural characteristics thereby making it essential that each training program fit the social-cultural context of the potential passengers and employees. Not an easy task but doable,” he said.

In the interview Kirschenbaum pointed out that most security technology in today’s airports were born as a “reactive solution to what has happened.”

“It's a "cops and robbers" scenario,” he said. “From our research, it has become clear that the "human factor" will prove to be more decisive than technology in airport security.”

The reason for this, added Kirschenbaum, is because even technology requires human intervention and interpretation.

“It is here that the wide range of human nature, background, past behaviors and characteristics will play a key role in the decisions made,” he said. “Technology will be part of the background but not at the forefront of the security decisions.”

According to Kirschenbaum, airports should not be viewed as mass production facilities but “complex social service organizations where employees (and not machines) make key security decisions.”

BEMOSA's program, which focuses more on the security interaction between employees and passengers, will therefore provide better security and customer service than one based solely on technology, finished Kirschenbaum.

Read the full interview

Gatwick’s new security plan ignores the human factor

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

It is always a miracle when plans are actually implemented and even more astonishing if they work. The evidence we have is that they rarely do so.

The new security plan announced by Gatwick Airport calling for speedier passage by providing more “lanes” for passenger flow is a typical engineering solution. These solutions have been used for toll bridges, tunnels and highways for years and now we have them at airports.

Security area in South Terminal

Underneath the “make passengers happy” mantra is the aim to increase passenger flow and reduce waiting time. Absolutely great ideas, except that passengers have a way of not following the rules. And it is here that the idea that 5,000 passengers per hour will happily move along through the multi-colored security lanes according to the engineering tune falls apart.

The assumptions made about us as passengers (note: not people) – in what airport managers think of as a mass production factory – disregard the basic variety of behaviors associated with individuals, family units and groups that are thrust into an unfamiliar high risk security environment where threats are made every day.

By leaving the choice of “lane” open to the discretion of the passenger, and basing that choice on media instructions, is one of many fatal flaws in what could have been a better human factor-designed security system.

To make sure 5,000 people get through the security screening every hour assumes everyone is a good and well-informed citizen – an assumption that totally ignores the reality of people’s behaviors.

What is even more disturbing is that it ignores the reality of what happens every day at airports between security employees and passengers.

One more thing, while adding more color-coded lanes is commendable: what if I’m color blind?


*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Making airport security a service for passengers

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

The latest round of making airports more “passenger friendly” reflects what social scientists have long known about the way organizations adapt its goals and internal means in order to survive. The newest policy changes and pilot studies reflect this attempt. But will they work?

Source: TSA

Fact: airports are people servicing organizations.

Reality: they are still viewed as “mass production” units whose operations are based on industrial production techniques utilizing cutting edge technology.

In terms of security, passengers are viewed as an integral part of the mass production process where effective output relies on tighter “controls!” Passengers are not viewed as people but cogs in a complex machine.

But how do these two opposing views fit into what airport organizational administrators need to do in order to survive?

Today, the answer seems to be a repetition of the mass production perspective! Rather than revamping the airport into a people servicing organization, we see the same reliance on production techniques and “control.”

But people are not cogs in a mass production factory, they are customers who want a service. When this message gets through, perhaps the decision makers will start to think in terms of making security a part of the service package along with duty free malls and parking facilities which are customer oriented and have been proven to be both profitable and attractive.

*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Privacy vs. profiling in airport security

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

As a growing number of North American airports move to using human behavior modeling methods, criticism over the usage of such screening methods is growing.

Jennifer Stoddart

The first to protest was Canadian Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart expressing concern over a government plan to scrutinize the flying public’s behavior at Canadian airports.

This was followed by US Congressman Bennie Thompson, who called for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to halt the implementation of a new behavioral screening program at Boston Logan International Airport. Both Stoddart and Thompson questioned the scientific basis of the plan and expressed concern over related privacy issues.

Anyone who has ever taken Intro Soc or Psych knows that we all profile, otherwise, how would we know whom to marry, in which neighborhood to live, what friends to choose, and to whom to turn when we need a favor!

Similarly, the furor over privacy is really an ideological debate (and its legalistic consequences) rather than a reflection of the same social processes that foster group rather than individual survival through such mechanisms as organizing into family units, community social networks and other types of organizational forms. Group survival has proven itself.

So the fuss about privacy and profiling has very little to do with how people behave and interact in the real world!

Well, it shouldn’t then come as a surprise to anyone that airport security employees profile – the most natural behavioral response when placed in a “survival type” situation where the next passenger might be a suicide bomber! This is no idle statement as there is substantial empirical proof to back this up.

Even passengers’ awareness of the airport security climate seems to illicit the same profiling modes. How can they not be affected when the loud speakers regularly broadcast insistent warnings about not leaving baggage unattended?

So why not just augment an already deeply ingrained behavior in all of us by making profiling a bit more sophisticated (as in the example of the Israeli airport) to enhance the ability of airport personnel to catch the bad guys? What good will your privacy or legal rights be when the bomb goes off?

* The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).