Privatizing Security Police

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

Policy makers should know better than to use single examples to argue for or against a particular policy. For every positive example there can always be found a negative example – the “ABC” of basic introductory research methods! So why all the fuss over a CNN story about security employees making a mistake: one that admittedly takes down the airport for a few hours? There is obviously something brewing that has led to the outburst of why the the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) should let go and allow more autonomy to local airports to hire their own security employees.

But what are the facts? From an organizational point of view, we are seeing competition over resources and control primarily generated by an organization’s need for survival and growth. The TSA, if it allows airports autonomy over their security, will simply become a funnel for budgets directly into the hands of local airport security managers. They may still determine safety and security standards but the consequence will be a radical downsizing and loss of political power.

On the other hand, the airports will be free to hire and train security employees according to their own views of how security should be implemented. Autonomy in this case brings with it greater control over the security environment and less dependence on external constraints.

Sounds good, but there is a BIG catch! It is probably irrelevant who does the hiring and training as the “proof of the pudding is in the eating,” and the BEMOSA project has shown that the key to enhanced security has to do with the employees. Utilizing the same training and procurement systems for technology will not eradicate the facts of life in airport security. There will continue to be social behavior that supports up to a third of the employees bending the rules and protocols; there is even a greater proportion that mistrusts the technology or the overwhelming decisions made on the basis of group think and not individuals.

So, all the fuss about control over airport security is really a smokescreen for the more generic problems that are embedded in our airport security systems. Does it really matter who gets the budgets, or who can hire or fire? What is needed is an evidence-based evaluation of airport security that focuses on the security decision-making process and then comes to terms with the results!

*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Individual initiatives outplay security instruments

Large percentage of security and other personnel in airports do not wholly trust their security instruments and, to some extent, rely on their gut feelings when it comes to inspecting passengers, according to a presentation given by Dr. Coen van Gulijk from the BEMOSA (Behaviour Modelling for Security in Airports) project at the European Organization of Security (EOS) meeting on January 16.

Dr. van Gulijk, who teaches at the Delft University of Technology, presented BEMOSA's findings showing that often security personnel use their own initiatives to double-check bags or items, even when the instruments they are using do not raise the standard alarms.

From the interviews and surveys conducted with security personnel, BEMOSA researchers also noted that group consultations usually form the basis of security decisions in airports, over individuals determining alone what course of action to take.

Dr. van Gulijk, said that observing the actual behavior of security workers in airports indicates that on a daily basis, many non-routine security events take place that trigger non-routine security behavior. This means that often ad-hoc decision-making ends up solving various security problems.

The study presented at EOS also shed light on the information network used by security personnel while at work. Findings show that the interaction between colleagues in different departments is essential, with workers turning to many different colleagues with their questions. In addition, security personnel often rely on regular passengers as reliable sources for security information about fellow-passengers.

Costa Concordia: Trusting Technology or Human Error

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

“State of art ship hits a reef close to shore. 4,000 passengers evacuated safely. Human error the likely cause.” Sound familiar? Now replace “ship” with aircraft or train and what we see is a pattern where the interaction of technology and humans sometimes doesn’t work out. This is especially acute when transportation safety and security decisions are abdicated to technology to be the final arbiter.

Source: Costa Cruises  

One of the factors contributing to the tragedy of the Costa Concordia, which ran aground last week off the Italian coast, is that in recent years large cruise ships are more dependent on sophisticated technology. So, for instance, news agency Reuters concluded that “computerized systems are taking over much of the safety burden and crews are dependent on what the equipment tells them.”

This does not mean that technology should be forsaken; but the degree of trust that decision makers place in technology will have a direct impact if “recommendations” or outputs are complied with. Those who did not place much trust that technology can detect or stop a threat were more likely to bend or even ignore the rules to fit the situation. So, in a sense, “human error” can be blamed in large part on trusting technology as the final authority in cases where security and safety are concerned.

In the case of the Carnival Corp.'s Costa Concordia cruise ship, state-of-the-art safety technology was in place. We will only know later on if “human error” can be identified as the culprit in the disaster. But if past findings are any indication, the reasons are far more complex and lie in both the methods that crews are trained in and the organizational directives that reinforce the use of technology to generate mindless decisions.

*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Why passengers and security personal don’t trust technology?

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

While the debate goes on about how far technology can go to make airports more secure, there has been a growing recognition it is nearing its limits.

This recognition has come partially from the backlash of passengers who feel they are being abused and from the bottom line costs to the aviation industry.

Airport passengers check-in

Passenger backlash, for example, is evident in the latest NPR-Thomson Reuters Health Poll about passenger health fears concerning airports and flying. Not surprisingly, passengers are more fearful of the security procedures in airports than flying! Nearly one quarter (23%) said they would refuse to be examined in one of the whole-body scanners now situated in many airports. A third of people under 35 said they would decline the scans.

The interesting quirk about health has more to do with trust than actual fact. Security personnel operating these machines do not need any “radiation” tags as its impact is minuscule.

Incredibly, the same phenomenon among passengers also appears among the very security employees who screen us. The BEMOSA Project has shown that a similar percentage of security employees don’t trust the very technology they use.

If we put this together with the fact that most also report that the vast majority of security incidents are false alarms, we are entering into a situation where the whole concept of airport security may be undergoing a radical change.

What these few pieces of information suggest is that airports can no longer be considered mass production factories where both the employees and passengers are seen as cogs in an intricate but totally controlled industrial process. The “cogs” apparently have a mind of their own! And, as the data point out, there is a point where control simply will not work.

Perhaps it is time to rethink past concepts of how security fits into an airport framework.

One alternative that makes a lot of sense is to view the airport as a service organization. Its goals are the provision of services to its clients – passengers – and in doing so will require security arrangements to mold themselves into the actual patterns of behavior of employees and passengers. This is a dynamic process but it is doable!

*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).

Passenger complaints drop, but is satisfaction rising?

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently announced that traveler complaints against it were near an all-time low. A recent report indicated that complaints about the TSA dropped in September to 1,418, the lowest since record-keeping began seven years ago.

So, if complaints are down, passenger satisfaction must be up? WOW! The TSA strategy must be paying off. Yet, anyone who has taken a basic course in statistics recognizes that this is an unpardonable and misplaced interpretation of the recent decline in complaints from passengers.

Source: TSA site

A dozen alternative explanations could account for the supposed decline which have nothing to do with customer satisfaction! Would the decline hold up if based on fluctuations in passenger rates each month (rather than raw numbers) or have passengers simply adapted to the “hassle” and/or fear of retribution by being put on a “list” for enhanced security if they officially complain? How many passengers feel “Why bother complaining when probably nothing will change?”

Not complaining for the official record does not mean that all is well! But it is a start!

With the realization that airports are a “customer-service business,” a major hurdle in the security “mind-set” of policy makers is taking place. It is probably for this reason that “out of the blue” customer complaints are making headlines. This is a good sign, but it is important to recognize that misusing statistics does not bode well in efforts to revamp prior notions of airport security. It will only increase distrust of authorities and lead to utilizing other forms of mass transportation when it is available. Both are death knells for the aviation industry.

*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).