The US presidential elections and selective airport security

By Prof. Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum*

The upcoming US presidential elections and the Republican National Convention approval of a platform calling on privatizing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have placed into stark contrast two opposing points of view of how airport security should be organized, maintained and operated.

But, as they are both couched in terms of ideology, we are faced with an empirical issue that has never been systematically tested, namely which perspective can produce results that will match what the visionaries of the future airport are looking for?

As ideological perspectives they both suffer from a number of deficiencies that can be simply called “selective facts.” The more scientific term is closer to “cognitive dissonance” where two contending sets of facts force the individual to ignore or place more weight on one set in favor of the other so as to maintain a degree of behavioral consistency. For those who smoke, for example, the fact that cigarette smoking kills is countered by another fact that “everyone dies” as justification for continuing smoking.

This also applies to privatizing airports or keeping them under public scrutiny when “a priori” ideology acts as a prism for the choice of facts to accept and those to ignore.

And what are the facts? This becomes a moot point as “facts” can be selective depending on the particular ideology one prefers. But there remains a light at the end of the tunnel that should provide the discerning reader with a picture of reality of airport security and not based on ideologically selective facts. I am referring to the recent BEMOSA project examining European airports across the continent which was inclusive of both the land and air aspects of airports.

The results of the BEMOSA study reflect a broad picture of airport security operations based on examining employees and passengers across an entire airport’s organizational structure and staff.

The picture provided was of the airport as a complex social organization with a variety of security behaviors that do not fit into the airport’s highly regulated, rule-dominated security system. Bending, breaking, and even going against the rules, frequently occur. Trusting technology affects whether employees follow rules or ignore them. False alarms are the name of the game.

In short, the BEMOSA description and analysis of behavior in airports shows us that there is no “zero-sum” game in airport security and that the present security system on paper does not exist in reality. And, yet, airports continue to grow and function.

What this suggests is that airports are really both private and public organizations. There are the security rules and protocols dictated by the public authorities (the TSA), but embedded in the security system are employees whose organizational security behavior reflects private bottom-line survival needs linked to adaptation and flexibility when the situation calls for it. In short, there is no ideal airport.

If these are the empirical (and not ideological) facts, what can be made of the opposing perspectives to enhancing airport security but simultaneously keeping us, the passengers, happy and the bad guys at bay? Should airports be given the ability to determine what is best for its particular needs or should we continue the public-associated oversight in place today?

As both exist within an airport’s organizational structure, it really comes down to a decision about balance – how much weight will be given to rules and regulations against how much flexibility will be allowed for employees in making judgment calls? That will be the true test toward developing airport security as envisioned for the future.

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*The writer is the initiator and coordinator of BEMOSA (Behavioral Modeling of Security in Airports).